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SEM1NOLE TRIBE OFFLORIDA v. FLORIDA:
HAS THE SEMINOLE TRIBE GAMBLED WITH
CITIZENS' RIGHTS TO SUE THEIR STATE
UNDER CERCLA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the formation of this nation's government, the federal
courts have recognized, to a certain extent, the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity.1 This doctrine prohibits an individual from suing a
state without its consent.2 Governmental immunity from suit is pre-
mised upon the notion that a right cannot be enforced against the
maker of law.3 Recognition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
by the federal courts has created a jurisdictional barrier for plain-
tiffs seeking relief, and as a result, victims of state governmental
misdeeds have often been denied the opportunity to seek relief in
the federal courts.4
1. SeeJane M. Ward, Note, Sullivan v. United States: Are Federal Public Defenders
in Need of a Defense', 40 VILL. L. REv. 233, 233 (1995). See also CLYDE E.JACoBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNIrY 150-64 (1972) (discussing various
rationales for judicial recognition of doctrine of sovereign immunity); JOHN V.
ORTH, THE JuDicL# POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 136-52 (1987) (detailing evolu-
tion of doctrine of sovereign immunity through twentieth century); Edwin M.
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE LJ. 1, 38 (1926) (explain-
ing that courts in United States have regarded sovereign immunity "as a matter of
simple logic"); George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immu-
nity, 13 IA. L. REv. 476, 480-81 (1953) ("Despite the absence of historical and
philosophical justification, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is today a part of
American legal dogma."). For a further discussion of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, see infra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
2. SeeJohn J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1890 (1983); Reginald Parker, The King
Does No Wrong - Liability for Misadministration, 5 VAND. L. REV. 167, 174 (1952).
3. SeeJACOBS, supra note 1, at 154-55 (citing Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
US. 349, 353 (1907)). In Kawananakoa, Justice Holmes offered the following as
justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of immunity of a sov-
ereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has
been public property since before the days of Hobbes. A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete the-
ory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
Id.
4. See id. at 153 (noting that "the immunity doctrine ... frustrates the per-
formance of one of the most essential government functions, the dispensation of
justice according to law"). See also PETER H. ScHucx, SUING GOVERNMENT, CrrIZEN
(479)
1
Hauck: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: Has the Seminole Tribe Gamb
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
480 VI-LANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 4 79
By enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Congress
sought to avoid the potential inequities of sovereign immunity by
authorizing suits against states in the federal courts.5 Pursuant to
its powers under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Con-
gress enacted CERCLA in response to public health problems cre-
ated by the disposition and release of hazardous wastes.6 CERCLA
created a $1.6 billion "Superfund" for use by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to pay for the costs incurred in respond-
ing to these problems.7 In the event that EPA has cleaned up haz-
REMEDIES FOR OFFICLAL WRONGS 38 (1983) (noting that doctrine of sovereign im-
munity's "harsh results ... could not have been congenial to judicial sensibilities
accustomed to remedying established wrongs").
In his first annual message to Congress, President Abraham Lincoln expressed
his displeasure with the concept of sovereign immunity. SeeJAcoBs, supra note 1, at
vii. The President argued, "[ilt is as much the duty of Government to render
prompt justice against itself in favor of its citizens as it is to administer the same
between private individuals." Id.
In 1946, Congress recognized the inequities created by this doctrine and en-
acted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Tort Claims
Act Revisited, 49 GEo. L.J. 539 (1961) (discussing provisions of FTCA in detail);
Ward, supra note 1, at 233-34 (discussing Congress' reaction to courts' expansion
of doctrine of sovereign immunity in early nineteenth century to government em-
ployees who committed torts during course of employment). Under the FTCA,
Congress waived a portion of the federal government's immunity such that injured
parties could hold the federal government liable for certain torts committed by
federal employees within their scope of employment. See id. at 234 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)).
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. For a discussion of the provi-
sions of CERCA that authorize suits against states, see infra notes 76-83 and ac-
companying text.
6. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120. At the time CERCLA was enacted, estimates indicated that industry
disposed one hundred billion pounds of hazardous chemical waste annually. See
126 CONG. Rc. 26,342 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of then Rep. Gore).
Of this amount, ninety percent of the waste was disposed improperly. See id. Con-
gress' decision to enact CERCLA followed EPA's findings that in 1979, an esti-
mated thirty to fifty thousand inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites
existed in the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120. These findings demonstrated the need for con-
gressional action since many of these sites posed a serious risk to public health. See
id.
7. See Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12
HAxv. ENvrL. L. REv. 385 (1988). Congress established this fund by imposing a tax
on the chemical industry. See id. Congress debated the creation of this fund and
justified it as follows:
Financing the Fund primarily from fees paid by the industry is the most
equitable and rational method of broadly spreading the costs of past,
present and future releases of hazardous substances among all those in-
dustrial sectors and consumers who benefit from such substances. The
concept of a fund financed largely by appropriations was not adopted. A
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ardous waste, CERCLA authorizes EPA to seek reimbursement for
these response costs from potentially responsible parties.8 Interest-
ingly enough, CERCLA also empowers potentially responsible par-
ties to file contribution suits against states in the federal courts.9
Authorizing potentially responsible parties to sue states in the
federal courts, despite the doctrine of sovereign immunity, raised a
question as to whether the federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction
over such suits was Constitutional. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co.,10 the United States Supreme Court faced this issue for the first
time in determining whether the federal courts had jurisdiction
over a suit brought by a citizen against its state under CERCLA. 11
Pennsylvania argued that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction
since the Commonwealth was immune from a suit brought by one
of its own citizens. 12 The Court found, however, that Congress had
abrogated Pennsylvania's immunity in CERCLA, and thus con-
cluded that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the action.13
In March 1996, the United States Supreme Court confronted
the almost identical issue in Seminole Tribe of Forida v. Florida.14
largely appropriated fund establishes a precedent adverse to the public
interest - it tells polluters that the longer it takes for problems to ap-
pear, the less responsible they are for paying the consequences of their
actions, regardless of the severity of the impacts. Too often the general
taxpayer is asked to pick up the bill for problems he did not create; when
costs can be more appropriately allocated to specific economic sectors
and consumers, such costs should not be added to the public debt.
S. REP. No. 96-848, at 72 (1980).
8. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For a review of this provision of CER-
CLA, see infra note 79.
9. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Specifically, this section
provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this tide, during or following
any civil action .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allo-
cate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as
the court determines are appropriate.
Id.
10. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
11. For a complete discussion of the Court's holding in Union Gas, see infra
notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
12. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22. Specifically, the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania argued that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment incorporated the
principle of sovereign immunity into the Constitution, and thus, the Court was
barred from exercising jurisdiction over the suit. See id. at 13-14.
13. See id. at 23 (reasoning that "Congress has the authority to render [states]
liable when legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause").
14. See generally Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
For a complete discussion of the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe, see infra notes
93-99 and accompanying text.
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Here, the Court had to determine whether the federal courts had
jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against its state pursuant
to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.15 In making its decision, the
Court overruled its earlier holding in Union Gas, finding that Con-
gress lacked the authority to abrogate a state's immunity in any leg-
islation enacted through the Commerce Clause. 16
This Note examines the federal courts' authority to exercise
jurisdiction over cases brought by citizens against their own state.
Part II of this Note discusses the origin of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and the Court's various attempts to determine the validity
of the doctrine subsequent to the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment. 17 Part III reviews the facts of Seminole Tribe and exam-
ines the Court's reasoning behind its decision.' 8 Part IV contends
that although the Court had various pieces of evidence to aid in its
resolution of the case, the majority relied primarily on precedent
that is clouded with uncertainty. 19 This section also discusses the
insignificant distinction between Congress' power to abrogate a
state's immunity and a state's ability to implicitly waive its immunity
from suit.20 Finally, Part V considers the impact of the Court's deci-
sion, and concludes that the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe has
completely relinquished a citizen's ability to seek relief against his
state in federal court under CERCLA.2'
15. See id. at 1119.
16. See id. at 1131 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.").
17. For a discussion of the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
enactment of the Eleventh Amendment and relevant case law, see infra notes 22-92
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts of Seminole Tribe and an examination of the
Supreme Court's reasoning, see infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
19. For a thorough critique of the Supreme Court's rationale in Seminole Tribe,
see infra notes 117-140 and accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of the inconsequential distinction between congressional
abrogation and a state's ability to waive its immunity, see infra notes 141-159 and
accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe on
citizens' rights to sue their state under CERCIA, see infra notes 160-166 and ac-
companying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law
"The belief that 'the King c[ould] do no wrong' originated
under English law."22 The early American colonists brought this
concept to the New World.23 Alexander Hamilton evidenced colo-
nial recognition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Federalist
No. 81 by explaining that all sovereigns maintained an inherent
power to be immune from suit without their consent.24 Although
the framers of the Constitution debated the inclusion of a provision
granting immunity to state governments, Article III of the Constitu-
tion seems to permit suits against states.2 5 Article III specifically
22. Ward, supra note 1, at 238 (citing W. BLAc.xsToNE, 1 COMMENRIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND, 24142 (1765)). This doctrine evolved from the conviction
that the King could not be compelled to answer in his own court. See Pugh, supra
note 1, at 478. Gradually, this belief of personal immunity for the King trans-
formed into the modem concept of sovereign immunity. See id.
Bodin, Hobbes and Machiavelli have been regarded as the framers of this
modem notion of sovereign immunity. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Re-
sponsibility in Tort, V 36 YALE L.J. 757, 785 (1927) (noting all three envisioned King
as law-giver, therefore, above law and not subject to suit by anyone).
23. See Pugh, supra note 1, at 480-81. Blackstone's Commentaries encouraged
the teaching of English law in American Universities. See also ERNEsr BARK ER, Es-
SAYS ON GovERNMzNT 128 (1965). Blackstone's first volume was published in 1765,
and in 1771, when tensions between America and England started to flare, all four
volumes of Blackstone's Commentaries were reprinted in Philadelphia. See id. at 128.
Prior to the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the thirteen colonies
had sold approximately 2,500 copies of Blackstone's work. See id. at 128 n.1.
24. TmE FEDERALIS No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Alexander Hamilton sup-
ported the notion of sovereign immunity by writing:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit
of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the gen-
eral practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.... [T]here is no color to pretend that
the State govemments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of
the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every
constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith. The
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the con-
science of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will.Id.
25. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a partial reading of the relevant
language of Article III, see infra note 26 and accompanying text. At least four of
the state ratifying conventions that debated the question of govemmental immu-
nity from suit believed that the drafters intended to hold states accountable for
violating federal law. See Gibbons, supra note 2, at 1902. In the state ratification
convention for Virginia, James Madison noted that he also interpreted Article III
of the Constitution to provide for suits against states, by writing:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another
state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the
5
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provides that, "[t]hejudicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and.., to Controversies... between a State and Citizens of
another State .... "26
In Chisholm v. Georgia,27 the Court faced the issue of whether
the Constitution provided the federal courts with jurisdiction over a
suit filed against a state when a citizen of South Carolina filed suit
against the State of Georgia.28 The Court, in a four to one decision,
decided that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had not survived
the ratification of the Constitution, and thereby held that the fed-
eral courts had jurisdiction.2 The Chisholm decision had an imme-
power of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it
can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it
must be brought before the federal court. This will give satisfaction to
individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a claim,
being dissatisfied with the state courts. It is a case which cannot often
happen, and if it should be found improper, it will be altered. But it may
be attended with good effects.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTrrUTION, 533 (Elliot ed. 1859).
Many colonists favored the idea that a state could be held liable in a suit
brought against it. For example, while attempting to muster support for its ratifi-
cation, Edmond Randolph, a drafter of the Constitution, told the Virginia Conven-
tion, "I admire that part [of the Constitution] that forces Virginia to pay her
debts." Gibbons, supra note 2, at 1906. On the other hand, some colonists were
displeased with the drafter's failure to incorporate state sovereign immunity into
the Constitution. For example, George Mason argued at the Virginia ratification
convention that:
Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated account, or other claim
against this state, will be tried before the federal court. Is not this dis-
graceful? Is this state to be brought to the bar ofjustice like a delinquent
individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be arraigned like a culprit, or
private offender?
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE F)F-
ERAL CONSTIrTION, 526-27 (Elliot ed. 1859).
Most scholars agree that Article III of the Constitution provided the federal
courts with jurisdiction over suits against states. See, e.g., Pugh, supra note 1, at 481;
ScHUcv, supra note 4, at 44. However, some commentators contend that the lan-
guage of Article III is not conclusive. See; e.g.,JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing
that "[the question of whether immunity was waived cannot... be settled by a
literal reading of the broad language of Article III").
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
27. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
28. See id. at 420. Chisholm was the executor of a South Carolina citizen's
estate who brought a suit in assumpsit against the State of Georgia. See ERWIN
CHEMEINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 373 (1994). He claimed that the State owed
the estate money for materials supplied during the Revolutionary War. See id.
Chisholm argued that Article III of the Constitution expressively provided the fed-
eral courts with jurisdiction over such suits. See id. The majority of the Supreme
Court ruled in Chisholm's favor. See id.
29. See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419. All five Justices of
the Chisholm Court wrote their own opinion. See id. Each of the four Justices who
6
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diate impact on the states, and Congress reacted swiftly by
proposing the first Constitutional amendment subsequent to its rat-
ification.30 The Eleventh Amendment specifically provides that,
"[t] he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State ...
B. The Scope of the Eleventh Amendment
Cohens v. Virginia0 2 marked the first time that a state asserted
the Eleventh Amendment as a defense in an action brought by one
of its own citizens.33 In Cohere, two criminal defendants sought ap-
pellate review in the United States Supreme Court after being tried
comprised the majority concluded that Article III authorized suits against a state by
citizens of another state. See id. at 450-51 (opinion of Blair, J.); see id. at 464-66
(opinion of Wilson, J.); see id. at 467-68 (opinion of Cushing, J.); see id. at 476-78
(opinion of Jay, C.J.).
In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Irdell concluded that the language
of Article III was insufficient to provide the federal courts with jurisdiction over an
action brought by a citizen against a state. See id. at 429-50 (Irdell, J., dissenting).
Specifically, he noted that section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that,
"'[a]ll the before mentioned Courts of the United States, shall have power . . .
which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreea-
ble to the principles and usages of law.'" Id. at 433-34. Justice Irdell argued that this
language required a recognition of the common law doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. See id. at 435-36.
30. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
AgainstJurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1058 (1983). By denying the states im-
munity, citizens would have been able to file suits against states to collect unpaid
war debts. See id. at 1058 n.114. As a result, British creditors would also have been
permitted to sue in order to reclaim property that had been seized during the
Revolutionary War. See CHEMIERNSlY, supra note 28, at 374.
To calm the early colonists' fear of financial ruin to state governments, the
House of Representatives proposed a Constitutional Amendment one day after the
Chisholm decision. See Fletcher, supra, at 1058. This original draft of the Eleventh
Amendment provided:
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the
judicial courts... at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or
citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate,
whether within or without the United States.
Id. at 1058-59 (citing PA. J. & WEEKLY ADVERTISER, Feb. 27, 1793, at 1, col. 2). By
January, 1794, Congress had agreed on what would become the final language of
the Eleventh Amendment, and the requisite number of states ratified it in Febru-
ary, 1795. See id. at 1059.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
32. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
33. See id. at 302-12. Prior to Cohens, the Court had actually entertained sev-
eral actions brought by a citizen against his own state. See e.g., McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (citizen successfully sued State of Maryland
challenging State's attempt to tax bank chartered by federal government).
1997]
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in a state court34 The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen
against his state.3 5 In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, how-
ever, the Court denied the motion, finding that the Eleventh
Amendment was irrelevant because an appeal of a criminal convic-
tion did not constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment.3 6 Nonetheless, Justice Marshall noted in dicta that
even if the action had been considered a suit, the Eleventh Amend-
ment would not preclude the federal courts from presiding over
such an action.3 7
Less than a century later, the Court in Hans v. Louisianas8
chose not to rely on Justice Marshall's dicta and dismissed a suit
brought by a citizen against his own state.3 9 In Hans, a Louisiana
citizen sought to recover unpaid interest on bonds and filed a suit
against his state alleging a violation of the Contracts Clause of the
34. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 268-69. The Commonwealth of Virginia
had enacted a statute that prohibited the sale of lottery tickets within the common-
wealth. See id. at 268. Virginia accused the Cohen brothers of selling a lottery
ticket for the "National Lottery" operated in Washington D.C. See id.
35. See id. at 303-12. The Commonwealth of Virginia argued that the Elev-
enth Amendment effectively reestablished the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
id. at 307.
36. See id. at 410. The Eleventh Amendment precludes the judicial power of
the United States from extending to suits commenced by citizens of another state
against a state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). Justice Marshall
found that the appellant had technically not filed a suit, and thus, the Eleventh
Amendment was not applicable. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 410. Justice
Marshall specifically held that:
Where, then, a State obtains a judgment against an individual, and the
Court, rendering such judgment, overrules a defence [sic] set up under
the constitution or laws of the United States, the transfer of this record
into the Supreme Court, for the sole purpose of inquiring whether the
judgment violates the constitution or laws of the United States, can, with
no propriety, we think, be denominated a suit commenced or prosecuted
against the State ....
Id.
In the end, the Court noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided the
Supreme Court with jurisdiction over actions in which the party had previously
obtained a final judgment in a state court. See id. at 264. The Court found, there-
fore, that it had jurisdiction pursuant to the Judiciary Act. See id.
37. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 412. Justice Marshall noted that if this
case were considered a suit, "[i]t is not then within the [Eleventh] [A]mendment,
but is governed entirely by the constitution as originally framed, and we have al-
ready seen, that in its origin, the judicial power was extended to all cases arising
under the constitution or laws of the United States .... " Id.
38. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
39. See id. at 10-11. The Court noted thatJustice Marshall's comments regard-
ing the scope of the Eleventh Amendment "ought not to outweigh the important
considerations ... which lead to a different conclusion." Id. at 20.
8
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Constitution.40 Hans marked the first time since the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment that the Court considered whether a citi-
zen could bring a civil suit against his own state in federal court.41
Relying on "history and experience and the established order of
things," Justice Bradley found that the federal courts lacked juris-
diction over the dispute.42
C. Citizens Seeking Relief from Their Own State
Although allowing a litigant to expand the federal courts' juris-
dictional limitations contradicts the plain language of Article III of
the Constitution,43 the Court has permitted this in certain circun-
40. See id. at 1. The plaintiff alleged that the Court had jurisdiction since the
dispute arose under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 3. Specifi-
cally, the Contracts Clause provides that, "[n]o State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The
plaintiff reasoned that the issuance of bonds by the State created a contract be-
tween the State and each bondholder. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 2.
41. See id. at 10. The Court noted that the language of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and relevant case law made it dear that a citizen of one state could not sue
another state in federal court. See id. The Court admitted, however, that since
Congress had ratified the Eleventh Amendment, the issue of whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against his own state had
been undecided. See id.
42. Id. at 14. The Court noted that Chisholm's failure to recognize the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity "created such a shock of surprise throughout the
country" that the Eleventh Amendment was almost unanimously adopted at the
first meeting of Congress thereafter. Id. at 11.
In Hans, the Court cited both comments made by several framers of the Con-
stitution andJustice Irdell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia as support for its holding.
See id. at 11-14. Specifically, Hans relied on the writings of Alexander Hamilton
and quoted the following:
"To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against states for the
debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it
could not be done without waging war against the contracting state; and
to ascribe to the federal courts by mere implication, and in destruction of
a pre-existing right of the state governments, a power which would in-
volve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and
unwarrantable."
Id. at 13 (citing THE FnDERALIS No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). For a discussion
of Justice Irdell's reasoning, see supra note 29.
43. See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and EIventh Amendments,
56 U. CHi. L. REv. 61, 66 (1989). This proposition remains somewhat anomalous.
See id. Article I of the Constitution lays out the specific cases and controversies
over which the Court hasjurisdiction. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Elev-
enth Amendment effectively limits this power by carving out an exception such
that the Court cannot preside over a case brought by a citizen of one state against
another state. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. The notion that the state can confer
jurisdiction upon the Court by waiving its immunity, therefore, suggests that a state
has the power to override the Constitution. See Massey, supra at 66.
Nevertheless, this concept was recognized prior to the ratification of the Con-
stitution in Hamilton's Federalist No. 81, when he argued that, "[i] t is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
9
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stances.44 For example, in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commis-
sion,45 the Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction over a
suit brought against a state where the state had expressly agreed to
be liable to suit.46 The Court reasoned that since the state had ex-
plicitly waived its immunity, the federal courts could hear the
consent." THE FDFRmUsT No. 81 (A. Hamilton). The Court actually recognized
this notion in Hans v. Louisiana 134 U.S. at 17. Quoting Justice Taney, the Hans
Court wrote:
"It is an established principle ofjurisprudence in all civilized nations that
the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its
consent and permission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privi-
lege, and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals, or
by another state."
Id. at 17 (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
44. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 280 (1959)
(finding that when State "approved a sue-and-be-sued clause... it waived any im-
munity from suit"); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (holding that Court
was relieved of determining the issue ofjurisdiction due to "the voluntary appear-
ance of the State"); Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309 (1853) (noting
that "by its own consent, the State has become liable.., if the complainant has
valid grounds entitling him to the relief prayed"). See alsoJohn R Pagan, Eeventh
Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REv. 447, 488-89 (1986) ("When a state consents to
federal adjudication, it waives not the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which a
litigant never can waive, but rather the privilege of enforcing a limitation on the
exercise of jurisdiction otherwise possessed by the court.").
Additionally, the Court in Fxparte Young recognized a significant exception to
the principle precluding the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits
against states. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Here, the Court found
that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude the federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief against state officials who had performed
unconstitutional acts. See id. at 159-60.
The Court in Edelman v. Jordan, however, limited the application of Ex parte
Young. See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974). In Edelman, although
the plaintiffs sued a state official seeking injunctive relief, the injunction would
have required the payment of funds that had been improperly withheld by the
state official. See id. at 655-56. The Court in Edelman held that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a suit
where the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief that would compensate for retrospec-
tive damages. See id. at 666-69. The Edeman Court noted that the federal courts
could exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of Fx parte Young only where the
injunction required expenditures by the State for future compliance. See id. at 667-
68.
Despite the Court's efforts to create a clear rule in Edelman, Mil/iken v. Bradley
evidenced that the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief was not
quite clear. See Milliken I, 433 U.S. 267, 288-89 (1977). The dispute in Milken
arose after citizens sued the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, seeking
desegregation of the public school system. See Milliken , 418 U.S. 717, 722 (1974).
As part of the Court's award of injunctive relief, the Court ordered the State to
implement educational programs that would compensate school children for ben-
efits that they had been denied. See Milkenf1, 433 U.S. at 290. The Court rea-
soned such an award was prospective in the sense that it sought to dissipate the
continuing effects of past misconduct. See id.
45. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
46. See id. at 280. In Petty, acting pursuant to the Contract Clause of the Con-
stitution, the States of Missouri and Tennessee agreed to form an agency in order
10
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case.47 Since its holding in Petty, the Court has recognized two
other permissible expansions of the federal courts' jurisdiction: (1)
the Theory of Implicit Waiver;, and (2) the Theory of Congressional
Abrogation.48
1. The Theory of Implicit Waiver
The Court established the Theory of Implicit Waiver by ex-
panding Petty's concept of express waiver in three decisions where
citizens had filed suits against their states through legislation en-
acted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.49 The Inter-
state Commerce Clause of the Constitution provides that, "[tihe
Congress shall have Power... [t] o regulate Commerce... among
the several States. . . ."- In each of these three cases, the plaintiffs
sought to obtain relief from their respective states, claiming that
their suits could proceed because the actions were brought pursu-
ant to statutes enacted through the Interstate Commerce Clause. 51
In Parden v. Terminal Railway,52 the Court permitted the federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought by citizens against
their state where the state had implicitly consented to such suit.5 3
In Parden, the Court reasoned that since the Constitution empow-
to operate a ferry across the Mississippi. See id. at 277. The contract provided that
the agency had the power to "'sue and be sued in its own name.'" Id.
47. See id. at 276-82. In making its decision, the Court noted that, "[tihis is
not enlarging the jurisdiction of the federal courts but only recognizing as one of
its appropriate applications the business activities of [a state] agency active in com-
merce ... ." Id. at 281.
48. For a discussion of these theories, see infra notes 49-75 and accompanying
text.
49. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987) (holding that only where Congress has provided "unmistakably dear" state-
ment of its intent to hold state amenable to suit will Court find that state has
waived its immunity); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (requiring congressional
statement authorizing suit against state in order to find implicit waiver of immu-
nity); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964), ovemded in part by
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding
that federal courts have jurisdiction over case brought by citizen against his state
where state has implicitly waived its immunity).
50. U.S. CoNST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51. For a discussion of each of these cases, see infra notes 52-63 and accompa-
nying text.
52. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), ovemded in part by Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
53. See id at 192-93. The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) permitted
employees injured in the scope of their employment to recover from employers
"engaging in commerce between any of the several States.. . .'" Id. at 184. Peti-
tioners contended that the State, as their employer, was subject to liability pursu-
ant to the language in FELA. See id. at 184-85.
11
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ered Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the State had im-
plicitly subjected itself to suit in federal court by voluntarily
operating an interstate railway.m The Court justified its decision by
pointing out that the State had actually surrendered a portion of its
immunity by ratifying the Constitution and thereby granting Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 55
In encountering the virtually identical issue less than a decade
later, the Court in Employees of the Department of Public Health & Wel-
fare v. Department of Public Health & Welfar 6 seemed hesitant to af-
firm Parden5 7 In Employees, citizens employed by a state health
facility sought relief pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) .58 Under the Parden analysis, any state that had participated
in a federally regulated activity would have been found to have im-
plicitly consented to suit in federal court.59 Realizing Parden's
54. See id. at 187-93. The Court raised two issues in resolving the case: (1)
whether Congress intended to subject the State to suit in these circumstances; and
(2) whether Congress had the power to subject the State to suit. See id. at 187. In
resolving the first issue, the Court determined that FELA's language holding
"[a]ny common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad," liable,
demonstrated Congress' intent to subject the states to liability. Id. at 188. For a
discussion of the second issue raised by the Court, see infra note 55.
55. See id. at 191. In making its determination of whether Congress had the
power to subject the State to suit, the Court reasoned that since the enactment of
FELA was an exercise of its commerce power, Congress was justified in making a
state amenable to suit in the federal courts. See id. In making this decision, the
Court relied on the well established principles regarding Congress' plenary powers
to regulate commerce:
"[The power to regulate commerce] is complete in itself, may be exer-
cised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the constitution .... If, as has always been understood, the
sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified objects is plenary as
to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, is vested in congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on
the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States."
Id (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824)).
56. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
57. See id. at 281-87. For a discussion of the Court's distinction between its
reasoning in Parden and its decision in Employees, see infra note 60.
58. See id. at 281. The Court in Employees applied the same test that the Court
had used previously in Parden. For a discussion of the analysis employed by the
Parden Court, see supra note 54.
In Employees, the Court first examined the language of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) to determine whether Congress intended to hold states liable.
See id. at 282-83. The Court ended its analysis here, however, since it found that
Congress had not conveyed an intent to waive the State's immunity from suit. See
id. at 285.
59. See id. at 285. The Court reasoned that its earlier decision in Parden im-
plied that the federal courts could have jurisdiction over a suit involving almost any
12
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broad implications, the Court in Employees held that the Theory of
Implicit Waiver required not only participation by the state in an
interstate activity, but also a statutory expression from Congress au-
thorizing the suit against the state.6°
The Court further modified the Theory of Implicit Waiver in
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation.6l
Here, the Court partially overruled Parden and refined the require-
ments set forth in Employees by permitting the federal courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a suit brought by citizens against their state
only where Congress has provided for a waiver of the state's immu-
nity in unmistakably clear language. 62 According to Welch, the The-
ory of Implicit Waiver required that the state participate in an
building within a state's governmental hierarchy. See id. The Court noted that
Parden's holding "implicate[d] elevator operators, janitors, charwomen, security
guards, secretaries, and the like .... " Id.
60. See id. In Employees, the employees of the health facility contended that
the Court's holding in Parden precluded the Court from recognizing the defense
of sovereign immunity. See id. at 282. In PardM, the Court had determined that
the language employed by Congress in FELA indicated that Congress had in-
tended to waive the state's immunity. For a discussion of the Court's decision in
Pardn, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
The Court distinguished its decision in Parden from Employees by finding a dis-
tinction between the language of FELA and FLSA. Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85.
FLSA pertained expressly to "'[e] nterprise [s] engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce.'" Employees, 411 U.S. at 283. The Employees Court
noted that although the language set forth in FEIA was specific enough to convey
Congress' intent to waive a state's immunity, the language of FLSA was not. See id.
at 284-85. Thus, the Court found that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction
since Congress had not expressly revoked the state's sovereign immunity in FLSA.
See id. at 285. The Employees Court justified its decision by reasoning that a respon-
sible Congress would not have intended for states to waive their immunity without
providing explicitly for such waiver in the language of the statute. See id. at 284-85.
The Court also distinguished the two cases by pointing out that the state entity
in Parden operated a railway, whereas Employees involved a state health facility. See
id. at 284. The Court in Employees noted that the railway operated for profit and
competed in an industry normally run by private persons while the state facility in
Employees was a not-for-profit and non-proprietary institution. See id. The Court
reasoned that state institutions not conducted for profit "have such a relation to
interstate commerce that national policy... indicates that their status should be
raised .... " Id.
61. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987). In Welch, an employee of the Texas Highways Department sued the State
after she was injured in the scope of her employment. See id, at 468. The em-
ployee claimed that she was entitled to relief since the Jones Act provided an award
of damages for such injuries. See id. After examining the language of the Jones
Act, the Court found that the language of the statute did not utilize the requisite
language to waive the state's immunity from suit. See id. at 475.
62. See id. at 478 (relying on Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985)). In making this decision, the Court held that "to the extent that
Parden v. Terninal Railway... is inconsistent with the requirement that an abroga-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmis-
takably dear language, it is overruled." See id.
1997]
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interstate activity and that Congress provide an "unequivocal ex-
pression" of its intent to hold states amenable to SUit.63
2. The Theory of Congressional Abrogation
While the Court in Parden, Employees and Welch analyzed suits
brought through legislation enacted under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause by applying the Theory of Implicit Waiver, in Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzey and Quern v. Jorda6 5 the Court considered whether
the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over suits brought by
citizens against their state pursuant to legislation enacted through
the Fourteenth Amendment 6 by applying the Theory of Congres-
sional Abrogation.67 The Court in Fitzpatrick and Quern did not ex-
amine whether the state had waived its immunity, but rather
considered whether Congress had the power to abrogate a state's
immunity.68
63. See id. Four members of the Court actually voted to overrule Hans v. Loui-
siana. See id. at 496-521 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Hans remains
good law, since Justice Scalia refused to subscribe to the dissenters' view. See id. at
495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent urged for the
overruling of Hans by pointing out that there was no support for the argument
that the Constitution prohibited suits by citizens against their own state. See id at
509-16. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that it was unnecessary to
render judgment on the applicability of Hans. See id. at 496. For a discussion of
the Court's holding in Hans, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
64. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
65. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
66. The relevant sections of the Fourteenth Amendment provide:
Section 1.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate leg-
islation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
67. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-57; Quem, 440 U.S. at 343-45.
68. For a discussion of the Court's holdings in Fitzpatrick and Quern, see infra
notes 69-75 and accompanying text. Although the statutes at issue in Fitzpatrick
and Quern had been enacted through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon considered whether Congress could abrogate a
state's immunity in legislation enacted through the Interstate Commerce Clause.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 234 (1985). In Atascadero, a diabetic filed suit pursuant
to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, claiming that a state hospital had discriminated
against him by denying him employment. See id. at 236. The state hospital con-
tended that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over the suit. See id. Consistent with past cases, the Court began its
analysis by reviewing the language of the statute. See id. at 244-45. The Court
noted, however, that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of that statute." See id. at 242. Applying this test, the Court
14
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In Fitzpatrick, the Court introduced the Theory of Congres-
sional Abrogation, finding that the federal courts could exercise ju-
risdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against his state because
Congress had abrogated the state's immunity.69 In making its de-
termination, the Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment
expressly granted Congress the authority to enforce the amend-
ment through legislation, and therefore, necessarily imposed a sig-
nificant limitation on state authority. 70 Based on this reasoning,
the Court held that Congress could enact legislation empowering a
citizen to sue his state in federal court to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.71
In Quern, the Court slightly altered the Theory of Congres-
sional Abrogation by holding that a clear congressional expression
was necessary to abrogate a state's immunity in suits brought under
legislation enacted through the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The
Quem Court rejected a citizen's attempt to hold the State of Illinois
found that the State was immune from suit since the statute failed to demonstrate
that Congress intended to abrogate the state's immunity. Id. at 246.
69. See Fitzpatric. 427 U.S. at 456. In Ftzpafrich present and retired employ-
ees of the State of Connecticut sued the State under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See id. at 448. The employees claimed that the state's employee bene-
fit plan discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. See id. The State
claimed that the Eleventh Amendment rendered the State immune from suit. See
id. at 450.
70. See id. at 456. The Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment limited
the protections of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. The Court reasoned that
when Congress acts pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, "it is exercising that
authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections
by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." Id.
71. See id. Specifically, the Court noted that section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "by ap-
propriate legislation." Id. Based on this language, the Court held that "Congress
may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States... which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the federal courts had
jurisdiction because federal question jurisdiction existed. See id. at 457. He argued
that the Eleventh Amendment was not at issue, since it precluded the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction only over suits where the federal courts' juris-
diction was based on diversity of citizenship. See id. He contended further that the
only issue in this case was whether the State of Connecticut could assert the non-
constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense. See id. Nonetheless,
Justice Brennan concluded that this defense was not available since it had been
abandoned by the ratification of the Constitution. See id. at 457-58.
72. See Qtun, 440 U.S. at 342. Specifically, the Court found that the federal
courts lacked jurisdiction because Congress had not dearly indicated that it in-
tended "to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several
States." Id.
1997] 493
15
Hauck: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: Has the Seminole Tribe Gamb
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
494 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 479
liable in a suit brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 73 The
Court reasoned that Congress' failure to specifically express its in-
tent to hold states liable in the language of the statute indicated
congressional respect for state sovereign immunity.74 Thus, after
Quem, the Theory of Congressional Abrogation permitted the fed-
eral courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits brought by a citizen
against his state through legislation enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment where Congress had abrogated the state's immunity in
a clear statutory expression.75
D. CERCLA
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Congress attempted to
avoid the unjust results that accompany judicial recognition of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity by specifically authorizfing suits
against states in federal court.7 6 CERCA requires parties who have
73. See id. at 342-45. In Quern, to determine whether the federal courts had
jurisdiction over the suit, the Court relied principally on Employees. See id. at 343-
45. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Employees, see supra notes 56-60 and
accompanying text. The Court reasoned that since the Employees Court had re-
quired a clear congressional expression to abrogate a state's immunity under ac-
tions brought through the Commerce Clause, a similar expression was necessary in
actions brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 343-44.
74. See id. at 344-45. In examining the language of the statute, the Court
noted:
[The Civil Rights Act of 1871] does not explicitly and by clear language
indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States;
nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state
liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.
Id. at 345.
75. See id. In support of its conclusion, the Court noted:
Given the importance of the States' traditional sovereign immunity, if in
fact the Members of the 42d Congress believed that § 1 of the 1871 Act
overrode that immunity, surely there would have been lengthy debate on
this point and it would have been paraded out by the opponents of the
Act along with other evils that they thought would result from the Act.
Instead, § 1 passed with only limited debate and not one Member of Con-
gress mentioned the Eleventh Amendment or the direct financial conse-
quences to the States of enacting § 1. We can only conclude that this
silence on the matter is itself a significant indication of the legislative
intent of § 1.
Id. at 343.
76. See Glass, supra note 7, at 389; Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,2 (1982); Edward L Stohbehn, Jr., The Bases for
Federal/State Relationships in Environmental Law, 12 ENVrL. L. REP. 15074, 15083
(1982).
In 1978, President Carter declared a state of emergency in Love Canal, New
York, after the city's water supply became contaminated. See Glass, supra at 387.
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/5
1997] SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA 495
had control over hazardous materials to notify the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) of the storage and release of such sub-
stances.77 After receiving notice, EPA evaluates the potential health
risks and formulates a response plan. 78
CERCLA provides EPA with broad powers to hold any "person"
or "owner or operator" liable for the costs associated with imple-
menting the response plan.7 When Congress enacted CERCLA, it
Developers had constructed this neighborhood on an abandoned dump and haz-
ardous waste had seeped into the water. See id.
Congress enacted CERCIA on December 11, 1980 as a direct result of this
discovery. See id. at 389. CERCLA was passed during the "lameduck" days of the
96th Congress. See id, Accordingly, the statute does not lack deficiencies. See id. at
390 (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affid, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that CER-
CLA is "'a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague termi-
nology and deleted provisions'")).
77. See CERCIA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c). Specifically, this provision re-
quires that:
[A]ny person who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal owned
or operated, or who accepted hazardous substances for transport and se-
lected, a facility at which hazardous substances . . . are or have been
stored, treated, or disposed of shall.... notify the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency of the existence of such facility ....
Id.
78. See id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. Once EPA has reason to believe that a
certain material released into the environment poses a risk to health, it "may un-
dertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information
gathering as [it] may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and
extent of the release or threat. . . ." Id. § 104(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1).
79. See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section provides that:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
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expressly included states in its definitions of both "person" and
"owner or operator."80
In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by enacting the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).81 One
purpose of SARA was to assist states in fulfilling their obligations
under CERCLA.82 In doing so, SARA expressly limited state liability
in instances where the state had obtained ownership of property
involuntarily by virtue of its function as the sovereign. 3
E. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
In 1989, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. addressed
whether the federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit brought by a
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study car-
ried out [consistent with] this title.
Id.
80. Id. §§ 101(20)(A),(21), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A),(21). CERCLA specifi-
cally provides that "[t]he term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body." Id. §101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
In defining the term owner or operator, CERCIA provides that:
The term 'owner or operator' means... (iii) in the case of any facility,
title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax
delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local
government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
Id § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A).
81. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1994)) [hereinafter SARA].
82. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 54 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2836 (noting that SARA aimed to provide "assistance to the states in fulfilling
their role in the Superfund program").
83. See CERCIA § 101 (20) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D). The amendments
clarified the meaning of owners and operators by providing that:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local
government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through
bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in
which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function
as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not ap-
ply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facil-
ity, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions
of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both proce-
durally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity ....
18
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citizen against its state under CERCLA.8 4 In Union Gas, Penn-
sylvania argued that it was not liable because: (1) the language of
CERCLA had not clearly abrogated its immunity from suit; and (2)
CERCLA was unconstitutional because Congress did not have the
power to enact legislation holding a state amenable to suit by one
of its citizens in the federal courts.8 5 Although five Justices wrote
opinions concerning the issues raised in this controversial case, a
bare majority rejected both of Pennsylvania's arguments.8 6
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, refuted the
first of Pennsylvania's arguments, noting that CERCLA rendered
"person[s]" and "owner[s] or operator[s]" liable for the costs asso-
ciated with remedial action under CERCLA.8 7 The Court further
noted that the statutory definitions of "persons" and "owners or op-
84. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989). The predecessors of
the Union Gas Company operated a coal gasification plant in Stroudsburg, Penn-
sylvania, which had produced coal tar as a byproduct. See id. In 1980, the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania obtained an easement to this property. See id. During
excavations on this property, the Commonwealth struck a large deposit of coal tar
which subsequently seeped into a nearby creek. See id.
The United States paid $720,000 to dean up the area. See id. at 6. The United
States filed a suit pursuant to CERCLA against Union Gas Company, seeking reim-
bursement for this expenditure. See id. Union Gas Company then filed a third-
party complaint against Pennsylvania, asserting that the Commonwealth was liable
for a portion of the clean up costs. See id.
The district court dismissed the third-party complaint, accepting Penn-
sylvania's contention that the Eleventh Amendment provided for its immunity
from suit. See id. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that CERCLA did not
provide a dear expression of Congress' intent to hold a state liable. See id. (citing
United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986)).
While Union Gas' petition for certiorari was pending, Congress amended
CERCLA by enacting the SARA amendments. See id. As a result, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of these amendments. See id.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that the statute, as amended, provided a
clear expression of congressional intent to hold states liable. See id. (citing United
States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1986)). The Third Circuit also
held that Congress had the power to abrogate a state's immunity when enacting
legislation under the Commerce Clause. See id. (citing United States v. Union Gas
Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1986)).
85. See id. at 11-14. Pennsylvania contended that CERCLA only authorized a
suit against a state if it was brought by the United States, rather than by a private
entity. See id. at 11. In support of its second contention, Pennsylvania argued that
the principle of sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
barred congressional abrogation of its immunity from suit. See id. at 13-14.
86. See id. at 5. The Court's conclusion that Congress had clearly expressed its
intent to strip the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity was supported by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Scalia. See id. at 5, 29. Addi-
tionally, the Court's finding that Congress had the power to abrogate a state's im-
munity through the Commerce Clause was supported by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and White. See id. at 5, 45.
87. Id. at 7 (citing CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). For a discussion
of this provision, see supra note 79.
1997]
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erators" explicitly included states.88 Accordingly, based on the
plain language of the statute, the Court found that the language of
CERCLA abrogated the state's immunity in unmistakable clarity.19
The Court rendered its decision on Pennsylvania's second ar-
gument by relying primarily on Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, in which the
Court had applied the Theory of Congressional Abrogation where a
plaintiff had filed suit pursuant to legislation enacted through the
Fourteenth Amendment.9° In doing so, the Union Gas Court found
88. Id. (citing CERCLA 3§ 101(20)(A),(21), 42 U.S.C. 3§ 9601(20)(A),(21)).
For a further discussion of these provisions, see supra note 80.
The plurality noted two additional provisions of CERCIA that supported its
argument. See id. at 9-10. First, the plurality noted that § 9607(d) (2) of CERCLA
provided that, "[n]o State ... shall be liable.., for costs or damages as a result of
actions taken in response to an emergency created by the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility owned by another
person." Id. at 9 (citing CERCILA § 107(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2)). He rea-
soned that this section presumed that Congress recognized the potential of state
liability. See id. at 10.
Second, the plurality noted that Congress effectively waived the federal gov-
ernment's immunity in § 9620(a) (1) of CERCILA when it provided that, "[e]ach
department. . . of the United States ... shall be subject to, and comply with, this
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent.., as any nongovernmental
entity...." Id. (citing CERCLA § 120(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1)). Since Con-
gress mirrored this language in § 9601(20) (D) in describing the potential liability
of states, the plurality concluded that Congress must have also intended to over-
ride a state's immunity from suit. See id.
89. See id. at 13. In his dissenting opinion, however,Justice White argued that
the language of CERCLA did not abrogate a state's immunity in unmistakably dear
language. See id. at 45. In his analysis, Justice White examined the statute as two
separate pieces of legislation. See id. at 45-57. He first reviewed the language of
CERCIA as enacted in 1980, and cited the district court's finding as support for
his conclusion that the statute did not abrogate states' immunity in unmistakable
clarity. See id. at 45-50. In the second part of his review, he separately analyzed
SARA and held that these amendments also failed to rise to the level of unmistaka-
ble clarity. See id. at 55-56.
90. See id. at 15-17. The plurality summarized the "trail" that unmistakably led
to its conclusion in Union Gas. Id. at 14. The plurality began with the Court's
decision in Parden, noting that although the Court characterized that case as one
involving a waiver of immunity, the Court's reasoning laid the foundation for the
concept of abrogating a state's sovereign immunity. See id, The plurality discussed
how the Court expanded this idea in Employees by requiring an expression from
Congress to override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See it . at
14-15. He further explained that when the Welch Court modified its holding in
Employees to require an unequivocal expression from Congress, the Court had actu-
ally assumed that Congress had the authority to abrogate a state's immunity
through the Commerce Clause. See id The plurality then pointed to Fitzpatrick,
which held that Congress could abrogate a state's immunity in statutes enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 15. Combining the concepts
developed in each of these cases, the plurality concluded that Congress had the
power to abrogate a state's immunity in statutes enacted through the Commerce
Clause. See id.
For a discussion of the Court's holdings in Parden, Employees and Welch, see
supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
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that Congress also had the power to abrogate a state's immunity
through legislation enacted through the Commerce Clause.91 The
Court reasoned that, like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Com-
merce Clause necessarily limits the principle of state sovereign im-
munity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. 92 Although the
Union Gas Court concluded that the federal courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against its state under a
statute enacted through the Commerce Clause, the Court revisited
this issue in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
91. See id. at 16. The plurality found that the Court's reasoning in Fitzpatfick
concerning the Fourteenth Amendment was also applicable to the Commerce
Clause. See id. at 16-17. He pointed out that both of these Constitutional provi-
sions "with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power
away from the States." Id. at 16. He compared these Constitutional provisions and
pointed out that while the Fourteenth Amendment provides for this exchange of
power in two steps (i.e. §§ 1-4 plus § 5), the Commerce Clause expands federal
power and contracts state power in just one. See id. at 17. The plurality summed
up this argument noting that the following is equally applicable to the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause:
Such enforcement [of the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment] is
no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can be, which-the people of the
States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Con-
gress to enact.... [I] n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the
limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her
rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general gov-
ernment the right to exercise all its granted powers, though they may
interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would have if those powers
had not been thus granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the gen-
eral government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmen-
tal powers of the States. It is carved out of them.
Id. at 16 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1976)).
92. See id. at 16-17. In his dissenting opinionJustice Scalia distinguished stat-
utes enacted through the Fourteenth Amendment from laws passed pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. See id. at 40-41. He argued that Congress was justified in
abrogating a state's immunity in Fitzpatrick only because the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified after the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 42. Thus, relying on
chronology, he found that statutes enacted through the Commerce Clause could
not deny a state its sovereign immunity. See id.
The plurality offered an argument to counter Justice Scalia's contention. See
id. at 17-18. The plurality pointed out that Justice Scalia had adopted the belief
that the principle of sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
had existed since the days before the Constitution was ratified. See id. The plural-
ity decided that based on Justice Scalia's understanding, the Commerce Clause
does not pre-date the concept of sovereign immunity. See id. Thus, the plurality
concluded that since sovereign immunity had been recognized prior to the ratifi-
cation of the Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia's argument based on chronology
was flawed. See id.
21
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III. Seminole Tibe of Forida v. Horida
A. Facts
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe sued the State of Flor-
ida and its governor.93 The Seminole Tribe alleged that the State
had violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA),
which Congress had enacted through the Indian Commerce
Clause.94 The Seminole Tribe sought an injunction requiring cer-
tain state officials to negotiate for the formation of a tribal-state
compact that would allow the Seminole Tribe to conduct certain
gaming activities in Florida.95
The State of Florida filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
Eleventh Amendment rendered it immune from suit and thus pre-
cluded the Seminole Tribe from bringing suit in federal court.96
93. See Seminole TribA 116 S. Ct. at 1121. The Seminole Tribe also sued the
Governor of Florida under the doctrine of Exparte Young. See id. at 1121-22. This
doctrine enables plaintiffs to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional
bar by allowing plaintiffs to obtain injunctive relief from state officials. Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). This Note does not consider the issues raised
by the Seminole Tribe's claim against the Governor. For a brief discussion of the
doctrine of Ex parte Young, see supra note 44.
94. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. The Constitution explicitly provides
that, "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [tio regulate Commerce... with the
Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress enacted the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) for the following reasons:
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an In-
dian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other
corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory
authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal
standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a
National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet con-
gressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming
as a means of generating tribal revenue.
IGRA § 3, 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1994).
95. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. The Seminole Tribe claimed that the
State had violated 25 U.S.C. § 2701(d) (3). Id. This section of IGRA provides that:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
class mI gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall
request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotia-
tions for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing
the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such
a compact.
IGRA § 11(d)(3)(A), 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
96. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121.
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/5
1997] SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA 501
The district court denied the motion.9 7 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.98 In a five to four
97. See id. In the district court, the Seminole Tribe argued that dismissal was
inappropriate since Congress had abrogated the State's Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 657 (S.D. Fla.
1992). The district court agreed with this argument and denied Florida's motion
to dismiss. See id. at 663.
The district court began its inquiry noting that congressional abrogation of
the State's immunity required both a clear expression from Congress and congres-
sional power to do so. See id. at 658. Applying this test, the district court first
examined the language of the statute to determine whether Congress had pro-
vided for abrogation in unmistakably clear language. See id. After examining 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i), the district court found that IGRA dearly provided for
the abrogation of a states' immunity. See id. For a discussion of the language of 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i), see infra note 102.
The district court then had to determine whether Congress had the power to
abrogate a state's immunity in legislation enacted through the Indian Commerce
Clause. Semino/e Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658. The district court relied primarily on
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., in which the Court held that Congress had the
power to abrogate a state's immunity though legislation enacted through the Com-
merce Clause. See id. Noting that the power to regulate interstate commerce and
Indian commerce is contained within the same dause in the Constitution, the dis-
trict court determined that "Congress' power to act pursuant to the Indian Com-
merce Clause is at least as great, if not greater, than its powers under the Interstate
Commerce Clause." Id. at 662. Based on these findings, the district court found
that Congress had the power to abrogate a state's immunity through legislation
enacted through the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. For a discussion of the
Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., see supra notes 84-92 and accom-
panying text.
98. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1121-22. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the district court that Congress intended to abrogate the state's sovereign immu-
nity in § 2710(d)(7) of IGRA. See id. at 1121. However, the Eleventh Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's condusion that the Indian Commerce Clause
granted Congress the power to abrogate a state's immunity. See id.
In making its determination, the Eleventh Circuit applied the same two part
test used by the district court. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016,
1024 (l1th Cir. 1994). In a brief analysis, the circuit court disposed of the first
issue by analyzing the language of IGRA, finding that the statute manifested Con-
gress's intent to abrogate a state's immunity. See id. In determining the second
prong of the test, the Seminole Tribe argued that Congress had enacted IGRA
through the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. See id. at 1025.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument and found that Congress enacted
IGRA solely under the Indian Commerce Clause. See id at 1026.
The Seminole Tribe then reiterated its argument used in the district court,
namely, that since Congress could abrogate a state's immunity through legislation
passed through the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress could do the same
through the Indian Commerce Clause. See id. The Eleventh Circuit, however dis-
tinguished the Interstate Commerce Clause from the Indian Commerce Clause.
See id. at 1027. The circuit court noted that the Interstate Commerce Clause allows
"Congress to place limits on the states in order to 'maintain[ ] free trade among
the States.'" Id. The Eleventh Circuit further noted that the purpose of the Indian
Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with powers to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs. See id. Based on the different purposes of these Constitutional pro-
23
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decision, the Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., and af-
firmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, finding that the Eleventh
Amendment precluded Congress from abrogating a state's sover-
eign immunity through legislation enacted through the Commerce
Clause.9
B. The Court's Rationale
Writing the opinion for the majority, Justice Rehnquist set
forth a two-prong test to determine whether the Eleventh Amend-
ment permitted the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen against its state through legislation enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 100 This test required the
Court to determine: (1) whether the language of IGRA unequivo-
cally expressed Congress' intent to abrogate the state's immunity;
and (2) whether Congress had acted pursuant to a valid exercise of
power by abrogating a state's immunity in IGRA.' 0 '
In examining the first prong of the test, the Court analyzed the
language of the statute,10 2 and concluded that Congress had clearly
visions, the circuit court found it unnecessary to extend the power to abrogate a
state's immunity to legislation enacted through the Indian Commerce Clause. See
id.
The Eleventh Circuit also justified its finding by distinguishing Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co. and its supporting precedent from the case at hand. See id. at 1028.
The circuit court noted that in all of the cases where the Court had found that the
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction, the State had actively participated in an
activity normally conducted by private companies. See id. (citing Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (discussing State's ownership of polluted land);
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (examining State's operation of rail-
way in interstate commerce)). The Eleventh Circuit distinguished the present case
by explaining that Florida had acted "'wholly within [the States'] sphere of author-
ity.'" Id. Interestingly enough, the circuit court also noted that the Supreme
Court's change in composition since the Union Gas decision made "it likely that a
majority of the present Court would disagree with Union Gas and find that Con-
gress was not empowered to abrogate the states' immunity." Id. at 1027.
99. See id. at 1128. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas comprised the majority. See id. at 1119. The dissent in-
cluded Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. See id. For a discussion of
the majority's rationale, see notes 100-116 and accompanying text.
100. See id. at 1123.
101. See id. The Supreme Court actually used this same analysis in Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co.. For a discussion of the analysis used by the Court in
Union Gas, see supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
102. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24. The Court examined the follow-
ing sections of IGRA:
(7) (A)The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over -
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from
the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian
tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact
under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith,
24
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expressed its intent to abrogate a state's immunity in suits brought
under IGRA.103 With respect to the second prong of the test, the
Court noted initially that it had held a state amenable to suit under
the Theory of Congressional Abrogation only in two prior cases. 10 4
First, the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer had permitted a citizen to sue
his state in federal court through legislation enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment.105 More recently, in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., the Court had found that Congress could abrogate a
state's immunity in legislation passed through the Interstate Com-
merce Clause.1°6 Relying principally on the Court's holding in
Union Gas, the Seminole Tribe argued that since Congress could
abrogate a state's immunity through the Interstate Commerce
Clause, it could do the same through the Indian Commerce
Clause.' 07  Although the Court agreed that Union Gas supported
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to en-
join a Class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and
conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact entered
into under paragraph (3) that is in effect, and
(iii) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the
procedures prescribed under subparagraph (B) (vii).
(B) (i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subpara-
graph (A) (i) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the
date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotia-
tions under paragraph (3) (A).
(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A) (i), upon the introduc-
tion of evidence by an Indian tribe that -
(I) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into under para-
graph (3), and
(H) the State did not respond to the request of the Indian tribe to
negotiate such a compact or did not respond to such request
in good faith, the burden of proof shall be upon the State to
prove that the State has negotiated with the Indian tribe in
good faith to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the
conduct of gaming activities.
IGRA § 11, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
103. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1124. The Court determined that 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d) provided an "'unmistakably dear'" statement of Congress' intent
to abrogate the state's sovereign immunity. Id. The Court noted that this finding
was consistent with lower court's determination as well as the decisions of the
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See id. at 1123 n.8 (citing Ponca Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1410
(1996); Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 1410 (1996); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota (8th Cir. 1993)).
104. See id. at 1125.
105. See id. at 1125. For a complete discussion of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, see supra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
106. See id. at 1125. For a complete discussion of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., see supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
107. See id. at 1124-28. The Seminole Tribe made several arguments to sup-
port its contention that Congress could abrogate a state's immunity through legis-
lation enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause. See id. at 1124-25. First, the
25
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the Seminole Tribe's argument, the majority voted to overrule
Union Gas, finding that it "has proven to be a solitary departure
from established law."' 08
The Court justified its decision to overrule Union Gas by relying
on established principles ofjurisprudence and its previous decision
in Hans v. Louisiana.109 The Court pointed out that the principle of
sovereign immunity enjoyed wide recognition in both English com-
mon law and in the colonial era.110 Noting that the original Consti-
tution did not include a provision specifically granting the states
immunity, the Court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment recti-
fied this deficiency.' The Court further pointed out that the Hans
Court had the first opportunity to consider the implications of the
Seminole Tribe argued that the federal courts had jurisdiction since it sought to
obtain prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary relief. See id.
at 1124. The Court disagreed, however, and found that such a distinction was
irrelevant. See id. (relying on Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)). The Semi-
nole Tribe also argued that abrogation of the state's immunity was appropriate in
this instance, since IGRA grants the state the authority to regulate Indian affairs,
which is a power that the state would not normally have. See id. The Court again
disregarded the contention, noting that such a consideration was irrelevant. See id.
at 1125.
108. Seminole Trib 116 S. Ct. at 1128. In making its primary argument, the
Seminole Tribe relied on the plurality's decision in Union Gas. See id. at 1125. The
Seminole Tribe noted that the Indian Commerce Clause makes "Indian relations
... the exclusive province of federal law." Id. (citing County of Oneida v. Onieda
Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226 (1985)). Based on this contention, the Semi-
nole Tribe argued that since "the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Gov-
ernment with 'the duty of protect[ing]' the tribes from 'local ill feeling' and 'the
people of the States,' [the power of abrogation is necessary] 'to protect the tribes
from state action denying federally guaranteed rights.'" Id. at 1125-26. The Court
agreed that the plurality's decision in Union Gas supported the Seminole Tribe's
argument. See id. at 1126. In fact, the Court specifically noted that, "it was in those
circumstances where Congress exercised complete authority that Justice Brennan
thought that the power to abrogate most necessary." Id. (relying on Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 20 (1989)). Nevertheless, the Court decided to over-
rule Union Gas, finding that the Court's holding in Union Gas had created much
confusion and that the decision was a sharp deviation from "established federalism
jurisprudence." Id. at 1127.
109. See id. at 1127.
110. See id. at 1130. The Court supported its finding by relying on Federalist
No. 81, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote, "sovereign immunity 'is the general
sense and the general practice of mankind.'" Id.
Justice Souter, in his dissent, however, engaged in a lengthy analysis of the
evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, concluding that the framers of
the Constitution did not intend to adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See
id. at 1161-72. He rebutted the majority's reliance on Federalist No. 81, arguing
that Hamilton supported precluding the federal courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion only over citizen-state diversity cases. See id. at 1166. For an examination of
Federalist No. 81, see supra note 24.
111. See id. at 1130. The Court noted that Congress reacted to the Chisholm
Court's failure to hold the State of Georgia immune from suit by enacting the
Eleventh Amendment. See id. The Court reasoned that Congress' quick reaction
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Eleventh Amendment and confirmed that it rendered states im-
mune from suit. 112
The Court also justified its decision to overrule Union Gas by
criticizing the Union Gas Court's reliance on Fitzpatrick.113 The
Court distinguished Fitzpatrick from Union Gas, noting that Fitzpat-
rick's application of the Theory of Congressional Abrogation was
proper because the statute at issue in Fitzpatrick had been enacted
through the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Commerce
Clause. 1 4 The Court reasoned that Congress had the power to ab-
rogate a state's immunity through legislation enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment because the Fourteenth Amendment was
demonstrated its surprise that the Chisholm Court failed to recognize the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See id.
112. See id. at 1127 (relying on Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing)). Both dissenting opinions in Seminole Tibe disagreed with the Court's deci-
sion to overrule Union Gas. See id. at 1134, 1145. Justices Stevens's and Souter's
opinions contended that the Court's mischaracterization of Hans produced a
faulty outcome. See id. at 1137, 1156. Both of these dissents rejected the majority's
reliance on Hans, pointing out that Hans did not preclude congressional abroga-
tion of a state's immunity. See id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued
that:
Hans does not hold, however, that the Eleventh Amendment, or any
other constitutional provision, precludes federal courts from entertaining
actions brought by citizens against their own States in the face of contrary
congressional direction . . . . Hans instead reflects, at the most, this
Court's conclusion that, as a matter of federal common law, federal
courts should decline to entertain suits against unconsenting States.
Id. at 1137.
Expanding on this contention, Justice Souter added:
The majority does not dispute the point that Hans v. Louisiana had no
occasion to decide whether Congress could abrogate a State's immunity
from federal question suits.... Hans conceded that Hans might success-
fully have pursued his claim "if there were no other reason or ground
[other than the Amendment itself] for abating his suit."
Id.at 1156.
113. See Seminole Tibe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The Court found that its decision
in Fitzpabiak was based upon a "rationale wholly inapplicable" to the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Id.
114. See id. at 1128. In his dissenting opinionJustice Stevens argued that the
majority misinterpreted the Court's holding in Fifzpatrick. See id. at 1142. Specifi-
cally, he contended that there was no reason to distinguish between statutes en-
acted through the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
Justice Stevens concluded his criticism of the majority's reliance on Fizpatrick by
arguing that:
The fundamental error that continues to lead the Court astray is its fail-
ure to acknowledge that its modern embodiment of the ancient doctrine
of sovereign immunity "has absolutely nothing to do with the limit on
judicial power contained in the Eleventh Amendment." It rests rather on
concerns of federalism and comity that merit respect but are neverthe-
less, in cases such as the one before us, subordinate to the plenary power
of Congress.
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enacted after the Eleventh Amendment, and thereby altered the
pre-existing balance between federal and state power. 115 On the
other hand, the Court found that application of the Theory of Con-
gressional Abrogation to legislation passed through the Commerce
Clause was impermissible, since the Commerce Clause had been
enacted prior to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. 16
lM. A CRIIcAL ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Amendment
1. Early Interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
The drafters of Article III of the Constitution granted the fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, and also over controversies be-
tween a state and citizens of another state. 117 In other words, the
Constitution, as originally adopted, provided the federal courts with
both federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. 18
Enacted shortly after the ratification of the Constitution, the
Eleventh Amendment altered the existing governmental structure
by revoking the judiciary's power over cases brought against states
115. See id. at 1128. The Court reasoned that prior to Congress' ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the states enjoyed immunity from suit. See id. Sec-
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, provided Congress with the
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through legislation. See id. By do-
ing so, the Fourteenth Amendment withdrew a portion of each state's immunity.
See id.
116. See id. The Court noted that it had previously recognized Congress'
power to abrogate a state's immunity in the Court's decisions in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. See id. at 1125. While Fitzpatrick involved abroga-
tion of a state's immunity through legislation passed under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court in Union Gas found that Congress had the power to abro-
gate a state's immunity through legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. See id. The Seminole Tribe Court pointed out that when Congress ratified
the Eleventh Amendment, it altered the entire Constitutional structure. See id. at
1128. Accordingly, the Court determined that abrogation was impermissible
through the Commerce Clause since the Commerce Clause pre-dated the Eleventh
Amendment. See id. The Court concluded by noting that "Fitzpatrick cannot be
read to justify 'limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution.'" Id. (citing Union
Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
117. See U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2. For a further discussion of Article III of the
Constitution, see supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
118. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1034-35. Article III confers the federal
courts with jurisdiction over some suits based on particular characteristics of the
parties. See id. at 1034. The most typical of this type of jurisdiction is diversity
jurisdiction. See id. In addition, Article III provides the federal courts with jurisdic-
tion over cases that involve certain subject matters, regardless of the characteristics
of the parties involved. See id. The most prominent example of this is federal
question jurisdiction. See id. at 1034-35.
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by citizens of another state." 9 The language of the Eleventh
Amendment can be interpreted in two ways. Some scholars argue
that the Eleventh Amendment should be read to repeal only the
federal courts' diversity jurisdiction, such that the federal courts
could preside over a suit brought against a state by a citizen of an-
other state only if the suit involved a federal question. 20 Other
interpreters contend that the language of the Eleventh Amend-
ment precludes the federal courts from hearing any case brought
against a state by a citizen of another state, notwithstanding the fact
that the case involves a federal question.' 2 ' Nevertheless, neither of
these interpretations suggests that the plain language of the Elev-
enth Amendment precludes a citizen from bringing a suit against
his own state, where federal question jurisdiction exists. 122
119. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. For a complete discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment, see supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
120. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 40 (1988); Lawerence C. Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment 102 HAv. L. REv. 1342, 1342-43 (1989). Under
this interpretation, the Court lacks jurisdiction only when the Court's sole basis for
jurisdiction rests in the diversity of the parties. SeeJackson, supra, at 40. Here, the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude jurisdiction if another basis for jurisdic-
tion exists. See Marshall, supra, at 1342-43 (1989). For example, if a citizen files a
suit against a state of which he is not a citizen that raises a federal question, this
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment empowers the Court to preside over
the case. See id. Congress' decision to alter the language of the original draft of
the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment's failure to mention suits brought
by in-state citizens suggest that Congress did not intend to bar the Court's jurisdic-
tion over federal question suits. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1060. For a discus-
sion regarding the language used in the original draft of the Eleventh
Amendment, see supra note 30.
In his dissenting opinion in Seminole Tibe, Justice Souter demonstrated his
support for this interpretation by noting:
The history and structure of the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show
that it reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively
under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses. In precisely tracking the lan-
guage in Article III providing for citizen-state diversity jurisdiction, the
text of the Amendment does, after all, suggest to common sense that only
the Diversity Clauses are being addressed.
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1150.
121. See id. at 1060-61. Supporters of this view contend that the Eleventh
Amendment repeals the federal courts' jurisdiction over any matter brought by a
citizen of another state against a state. See Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1060-61.
122. See id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter noted that most scholars
support the view that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits brought by
citizens of another state against a state where federal question jurisdiction exists.
Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1150 n.8. He contended that while a minority of com-
mentators has adopted the view that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction in
any instance where a suit is filed by a citizen of another state against a state, "I have
discovered no commentator affirmatively advocating the position taken by the
Court today." Id.
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Although Cohens v. Virginia did not require that Justice Mar-
shall interpret the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, he indi-
cated in dicta that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen
against his own state.123 The Court in Hans v. Louisiana, however,
disregarded Justice Marshall's acumen.1 24 In Hans' "somewhat
cryptic" opinion, it is clear that the Court dismissed the case be-
cause the federal courts lacked jurisdiction.1 25 However, commen-
tators have debated the Court's reasoning in Hans, and two theories
regarding the case's strict holding have emerged.
123. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 382-383. Specifically, Justice Marshall
wrote:
The powers of the Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and com-
merce, and on many others, are in themselves limitations of the sover-
eignty of the States; but in addition to these, the sovereignty of the States
is surrendered in many instances where the surrender can only operate to
the benefit of the people, and where, perhaps, no other power is con-
ferred on Congress than a conservative power to maintain the principles
established in the constitution. The maintenance of these principles in
their purity, is certainly among the great duties of the government. One
of the instruments by which this duty may be peaceably performed, is the
judicial department. It is authorized to decide all cases of every descrip-
tion, arising under the constitution or laws of the United States. From
this general grant ofjurisdiction, no exception is made of those cases in
which a State may be a party. When we consider the situation of the
government of the Union and of a State, in relation to each other; the
nature of our constitution; the subordination of the State governments to
that constitution; the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases
arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided
to the judicial department; are we at liberty to insert in this general grant,
an exception of those cases in which a State may be a party? Will the
spirit of the constitution justify this attempt to control its words? We
think it will not. We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of
the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may
be the parties to that case.
Id. For a complete discussion of the Court's holding in Cohens v. Vrginia, see supra
notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
Many commentators cite this section ofJustice Marshall's opinion to support
their argument that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude the federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against his own
state where federal question jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 30, at
1084 & n.207; Gibbons, supra note 2, at 1952-53. But seeJackson, supra note 120, at
24 n.108 (arguing that supporters of this position have read this passage out of its
context and thus their conclusion is based on misreading of opinion).
124. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 20 ("It must be conceded that the last observation
of the [C]hief J]ustice [Marshall in Cohens v. Vrrginia] does favor the argument of
the plaintiff. But the observation was unnecessary to the decision, and in that
sense extrajudicial . . . ."). For a complete discussion of the Court's decision in
Hans v. Louisiana, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
125. See Seminole Tibe 116 S. Ct. at 1137 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dis-
senting opinion in Seminole TribeJustice Stevens criticized Justice Bradley's opinion
in Hans as "somewhat cryptic," arguing that a careful reading of Hans demon-
strated that it actually rejected the majority's holding in Seminole Trbe. Id.
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First, supporters of the Theory of Congressional Abrogation
suggest that the Hans Court did not hold that the Eleventh Amend-
ment codified the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but rather ad-
hered to stare decisis by recognizing the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as common law. 126 Since the plaintiffs action in Hans
was not brought pursuant to a federal statute in which Congress
precluded the recognition of a state's immunity to suit, these theo-
rists contend that the Court properly applied the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. 12 7
126. See Massey, supra note 43, at 62. See also Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1063
(contending that drafters of Eleventh Amendment did not intend to codify doc-
trine of sovereign immunity); Gibbons, supra note 2, at 1936 (concluding confi-
dently that Eleventh Amendment was not intended to restore doctrine of
sovereign immunity).
Professor Massey calls this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment the "re-
visionist interpretation." Massey, supra note 43, at 62. He describes this position as
follows:
The revisionists assert variously that the amendment has no independent
prohibitory force, that it simply fails to authorize certain party based as-
sertions of federal jurisdiction and does not limit the federal courts'
power to hear suits against states founded upon a federal question, and
that, in any case, Congress may use its powers to strip the states of
whatever sovereign immunity was conferred upon them by virtue of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 62-63.
127. See id. In Hans, Justice Bradley wrote:
It is true that the same qualification existed in the judiciary act of 1789,
which was before the court in Chisholm v. Georgia, and the majority of the
court did not think that it was sufficient to limit the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. Justice Irdell thought differently. In view of the manner in
which that decision was received by the country, the adoption of the elev-
enth amendment, the light of history, and the reason of the thing, we
think we are at liberty to prefer Justice Irdell's views in this regard.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 18-19.
Many scholars have used this and similar language to argue that Hans simply
adopted Justice Irdell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm v Georgia. See, e.g., Fletcher,
supra note 30, at 1063; Gibbons, supra note 2, at 1934-36. See also Seminole Tribe, 116
S. Ct. at 1137 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In his dissenting opinion in Chisholm, Justice Irdell contended that the Consti-
tution failed to answer the question as to whether the federal courts had the power
to exercise jurisdiction over the suit. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433-36. He reviewed the
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and found that the statute required applica-
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See id. Thus, Justice Irdell reasoned
that since the Constitution did not resolve the issue, the Court had to look for a
statutory expression from Congress. For a further discussion ofJustice Irdell's dis-
senting opinion in Chisholm, see supra note 29.
Supporters of the Theory of Congressional Abrogation have borrowed Justice
Irdell's reasoning. See Massey, supra note 43, at 62-63 (referring to supporters of
Theory of Congressional Abrogation as "revisionists"). These commentators con-
tend that since the Eleventh Amendment failed to incorporate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the Constitution still fails to answer the question as to
whether the federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen
against his state. See id. Thus, supporters of the Theory of Congressional Abroga-
tion argue that Congress can provide the federal courts with jurisdiction over suits
1997] 509
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Second, other interpreters suggest that the Hans Court found
that the Eleventh Amendment actually codified the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity.1 28 In Seminole Tribe, for example, the Court
adopted this interpretation, and reasoned that the abrogation of a
state's immunity in a statute, such as IGRA, cannot displace a Con-
stitutional Amendment. 12 9
Hence, the plain language of the Constitution and the Court's
decisions in both Gohens and Hans provided the Court in Seminole
Tribe with three important resources for making its decision. While
the language of the Constitution and Justice Marshall's dicta in Co-
hens clearly indicted that the Eleventh Amendment did not pre-
clude the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits
brought by citizens against their own state, the Court's reasoning in
Hans was ambiguous. 30 It seems odd, therefore, that the Court in
Seminole Tribe relied on the interpretation of Hans which was incon-
sistent with both the plain language of the Constitution and Justice
Marshall's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.' 3 ' While
claiming to adhere to the established principles of jurisprudence,
brought by citizens against their state by enacting legislation that abrogates the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See id.
128. See Borchard, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that "the Eleventh Amendment
restored the ancient doctrine [of sovereign immunity]"). See, e.g., ORTH, supra
note 1, at 30-46; Massey, supra note 43, at 61-62. Professor Massey calls this the
"conventional interpretation" of the Hans decision. See Massey, supra note 43, at
61-62. In Hans, the Court noted that:
[Chisholm v. Georgia] created such a shock of surprise throughout the
country that, at the first meeting of congress thereafter, the eleventh
amendment to the constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and
was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the states. This amend-
ment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole coun-
try, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the
decision of the supreme court. It did not in terms prohibit suits by indi-
viduals against the states, but declared that the constitution should not be
construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. Professor Massey pointed to this language as support for the
conventional interpretation of Hans. See Massey, supra note 43, at 62 & n.8.
129. See Seminole Ttibe 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28 (arguing that decisions since Hans
dearly reflect that Eleventh Amendment incorporates constitutional principle of
state sovereign immunity). For a discussion of Seminole Tribe's interpretation of
Hans, see supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
130. Due to the confusion created by the Court's reasoning in Hans, many
scholars have argued that adherence to Hans should be abandoned. See, e.g.,
Welch, 483 U.S. at 521 (dissent arguing that "it is time to begin a fresh examination
of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence without the weight of that mistaken prece-
dent"); Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a High-
est-Ranked View of the Eleventh Amendmen, 1 Gso. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 1, 27 (1992)
(arguing that Hans should be overruled since it doses courthouse doors to "[w]e
the [p]eople").
131. In discussing the interpretation of Hans adopted by the Court in Seminole
Tribe, Judge Gibbons argued:
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the majority in Seminole Tribe disregarded both the plain language
of the cornerstone of our nation's jurisprudence and one of our
most esteemed and influential Supreme Court justices.
2. The Constitutional Effect of the Eleventh Amendment
The Court in Seminole Tribe also relied on its earlier decisions
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. to assist in its
determination of whether Congress had the power to abrogate a
state's immunity.13 2 Although these decisions demonstrated that
Congress has the power to abrogate a state's immunity through leg-
islation enacted under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Seminole Tribe Court distinguished these two Con-
stitutional provisions.'33 Specifically, the Court held that congres-
sional abrogation was proper only through the Fourteenth
Amendment since Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment af-
ter the Eleventh Amendment. 3 4 The Court reasoned that since
the Fourteenth Amendment altered the pre-existing Constitution,
states could be sued in federal court through legislation enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.13 5 Conversly, the Court
also reasoned that Congress lacked the power to abrogate a state's
immunity through legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause
because the Commerce Clause existed prior to the ratification of
the Eleventh Amendment.
Consistent with this reasoning, Congress' ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment also must have affected the pre-existing Con-
stitution. The Court in Chisholm v. Georgia held that the original
Constitution did not incorporate the doctrine of sovereign immu-
If the older industrial states of the Northeast, faced with shrinking reve-
nues, decided to balance their budgets not by curtailing support for serv-
ices such as higher education and welfare, but by eliminating debt
service, the shock to the nation's banking system, and thus to the nation's
money supply, would be profound. Yet under current eleventh amend-
ment doctrine, federal courts would not be able to hear suits by bond-
holders against the states. No amount of arid theorizing on the nature of
state sovereignty or the amenability of enforcements against state treasur-
ies could justify such a catastrophic result.
Gibbons, supra note 2, at 2004.
132. For a complete discussion of the Court's holding in Fitzpatrick v. Biter,
see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. For an equally thorough discussion
of the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., see supra notes 84-92 and
accompanying text.
133. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
134. Seeid.
135. For a discussion of Seminole Tribe's reasoning in differentiating its holding
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer from its decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., see supra
notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
19971
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nity.1 6 Yet, the Court in Seminole Tribe assumed that the Eleventh
Amendment codified sovereign immunity, even though the plain
language of the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits by
citizens against their own state, but rather, only suits against other
states.1 3 7 As Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion in Union
Gas, "[ i]t would be a fragile Constitution indeed if subsequent
amendments could, without express reference, be interpreted to
wipe out the original understanding of congressional power."138
In opting to ignore the principle of stare decisis by overruling
Union Gas, the Court in Seminole Tribe offered an unpersuasive dis-
tinction between legislation enacted through the Commerce Clause
and statutes passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.13 9
Although abandoning precedent may be proper when a decision
has proven to be unworkable, the evidence fails to demonstrate that
this burden was met.' 40
136. Four of the five justices who wrote opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia explic-
itly recognized that the original Constitution did not preclude the federal courts
from exercising jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of one state against
another state. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (noting "our Constitution most
certainly contemplates . .. maintaining a jurisdiction against a State" (opinion of
Justice Blair)); See id. at 466 (finding "doctrine [of sovereign immunity] rests not
upon the legitimate result of fair and conclusive deduction from the Constitution"
(opinion of Justice Wilson)); See id. at 469 (concluding "the Constitution warrants
a suit against a State, by an individual citizen of another State" (opinion ofJustice
Cushing)); See id. at 479 (holding "a State is suable by citizens of another State"
(opinion of ChiefJustice Jay)). For a discussion of the Court's holding in Chisholm
v. Georgia, see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
137. See Seminole Tribe 116 S. Ct. at 1122. For a discussion of the Court's de-
termination in Seminole Tribe that the Eleventh Amendment precludes a citizen
from suing his state, see supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
138. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18. Writing the plurality opinion in Union Gas,
Justice Brennan contended that:
[Assuming that the Eleventh Amendment introduced the principle of
sovereign immunity] the order of events would matter only if the Amend-
ment changed things; that is, it would matter only if, before the Eleventh
Amendment, the Commerce Clause did authorize Congress to abrogate
sovereign immunity. But if Congress enjoyed such power prior to the
enactment of this Amendment, we would require a showing far more
powerful than ... [the contention that] the Amendment was intended to
obliterate [the jurisdiction of the federal courts vested in Article III].
Id.
139. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
140. See id. at 1127. The Court in Seminole Tribe noted that the Court need not
adhere to precedent when "'governing decisions are unworkable or are badly rea-
soned.'" Id. Finding that the decision in Union Gas met this requirement, the
Seminole Tribe Court overruled it. See id. at 1128.
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B. Theory of Implicit Waiver v. Theory of Congressional
Abrogation
It is well established that the federal courts may exercise juris-
diction over a suit brought by citizens against their state when the
state has expressly waived its sovereign immunity. 141 In Parden, the
Court expanded this concept by introducing the Theory of Implicit
Waiver. 142 Here, the Court found that since the state had operated
a railway in interstate commerce, it had implicitly waived its immu-
nity, and thereby provided the federal courts with jurisdiction. 43
The Court in Welch partially overruled Parden by requiring an un-
mistakably clear statement from Congress of its intent to hold a
state liable in order to find that a state had implicitly waived its
immunity.'4 Even after Welch, however, it is arguable that the The-
ory of Implicit Waiver had survived by requiring both an implicit
waiver by the state and a statutory expression of Congressional
intent. 45
Conversely, the Court in Union Gas relied on the Theory of
Congressional Abrogation.146 Here, the Court held that the federal
courts had jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against its
state where the legislature clearly expressed its intent to hold a state
141. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959);
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883); Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304(1853). For a brief discussion of a state's ability to expressly waive its immunity
from suit, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
142. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-92. For a discussion of the Court's holding in
Parden v. Terminal Railway, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
143. See id. at 192. In making its decision, the Court noted that "immunity
may of course be waived; the State's freedom from suit without its consent does not
protect it from a suit to which it has consented." Id. at 186 (relying on Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436 (1883)). Accordingly, the Court found that "when it began operation of
an interstate railroad... [the State] necessarily consented to such suit...." Id. at
192.
144. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478. For a discussion of the Court's holding in
Welch, see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
145. See id. In Welch, the Court overruled Parden "to the extent that [it] ... is
inconsistent with the requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity by Congress . . . be expressed in unmistakably clear language . . . ." Id.
Accordingly, some commentators suggest that the Welch Court merely added a re-
quirement to the test for implicit waiver. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); CH mMsNsxy, supra note 28, at 410.
In his dissenting opinion in Union Gas, Justice Scalia recognized that the The-
ory of Implicit Waiver was not eradicated by the Court's decision in Welch. See
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42. After finding that Congress did not have the power to
abrogate a state's immunity, he noted, "[i] t remains for me to consider whether
the doctrine of waiver applies here." Id.
146. See generally Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1. For a discussion of the Court's hold-
ing in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., see supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
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amenable to suit.14 7 Thus, the Theory of Congressional Abrogation
required only that Congress provide a clear statement of its intent
to hold a state amenable to suit in federal court.
Some scholars suggest that the Theories of Implicit Waiver and
Congressional Abrogation are distinguishable. 148 These commen-
tators point out that although the Theories of Implicit Waiver and
Congressional Abrogation both require a statutory expression from
Congress, the Theory of Implicit Waiver has an additional require-
ment.149 Specifically, unlike the Theory of Congressional Abroga-
tion, the Theory of Implicit Waiver requires that the state implicitly
waive its immunity by participating in an activity regulated by Con-
gress.'50 By contrast, the Theory of Congressional Abrogation pro-
vides the federal courts with jurisdiction over a suit brought by a
citizen against his state in any instance authorized by Congress. 15'
147. See id. at 19.
148. See, e.g., Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting); CHEMIUN-
sKY, supra note 28, at 406-19; Pagan, supra note 44, at 491-98.
149. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 406-19; Pagan, supra note 44, at 491-
98. Specifically, Professor Pagan noted:
Two conditions must be met before a court may find that a state implicitly
waived its eleventh amendment immunity. First, Congress must have
manifested its intent to subject states to suit in federal court if they en-
gage in a certain course of conduct or participate in a particular federal
program. Second, states could have avoided the liability by staying out of
the field which Congress had decided to regulate.
Pagan, supra note 44, at 491-92.
Chemerinsky admitted that it was unclear whether the Theory of Implicit
Waiver had survived the Court's holding in Welch. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at
410. Nevertheless, he noted that, "[i]f [the Theory of Implicit Waiver] ever will
exist, it will be in situations where Congress indicates a clear intent to make states
liable in federal court if they engage in a particular activity, and then a state volun-
tarily chooses to engage in that conduct." Id.
150. See CEumMxsIy, supra note 28, at 410-19; Pagan, supra note 44, at 491-
95. In discussing the second prong of the Theory of Implicit Waiver, which re-
quired that the state engage in an activity within interstate commerce, Professor
Pagan contended:
The implied waiver doctrine presupposes a degree of genuine choice. A
state cannot "choose" to waive its sovereign immunity unless it has a real-
istic alternative. No state realistically could abandon its responsibilities in
fields such as education, public health, and law enforcement. To say that
a state voluntarily surrenders its immunity from suit in federal court be-
cause it elects to continue running schools, hospitals, and a police depart-
ment despite Congress's enactment of a liability statute is to indulge in a
legal fiction.
Id. at 495. For a complete discussion of the Theory of Implicit Waiver,
see supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
151. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 414 (noting the Theory of Congres-
sional Abrogation requires only that "a law in its text... clearly and expressly au-
thorize federal court jurisdiction over the state government"); Pagan, supra note
44, at 496 ("Abrogation analysis has only one prong .... The terms of the require-
ment are identical to those of the dear-statement test discussed... in connection
36
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol8/iss2/5
1997] SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA 515
This distinction is insignificant, however, because the Theory
of Congressional Abrogation is not applicable until the state has, in
effect, implicitly waived its immunity. Any Congressional regulation
is conditional in the sense that liability does not arise unless the
object of the regulation engages in an activity or holds a certain
status that produces liability. 152 In other words, a state cannot be
held liable unless it first triggers a condition prescribed by Con-
gress. 153 Hence, the Theory of Congressional Abrogation essen-
tially requires that the state implicitly waive its immunity, since a
State's potential liability does not arise unless the state triggers the
statutory condition. 15
For example, CERCLA provides for potential liability when a
person takes ownership of property. 55 Pursuant to CERCLA,
therefore, potential liability is conditioned on owning property.'"
Since CERCLA provides an unmistakably clear statement of Con-
gress' intent to hold states liable, the federal courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen against a state under the
Theory of Congressional Abrogation.' 57 Such a suit, however,
would not be brought unless the state allegedly triggers the condi-
tion of owning property, that is, unless the state implicitly waived its
immunity from suit. 15 8 In reality, therefore, the Theory of Congres-
with implied waivers."). For a complete discussion of the Theory of Congressional
Abrogation, see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
152. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. See id.
154. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "all fed-
eral prescriptions... can be redescribed as invitations to 'waiver'"). Id.
155. See CERCLA § 107(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). For a discussion of
this section of CERCLA, see supra note 79.
156. See id.
157. See genera/y Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1. For a discussion of the Court's
application of the Theory of Congressional Abrogation, see supra notes 90-92 and
accompanying text.
158. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although recog-
nizing a distinction between the Theory of Congressional Abrogation and the The-
ory of Implicit Waiver, Justice Scalia contended that there was virtually no
difference in the application of these two doctrines. See id. He recognized that the
Theory of Congressional Abrogation did not expressly require an implicit waiver of
immunity by the state. See id. at 43. Nonetheless, he pointed out that a state could
not be held liable until the state had participated in a regulated activity. See id. at
43-44. Thus, he concluded that the Theory of Congressional Abrogation does, in
fact, require an implicit waiver of immunity by the state since no liability would
arise unless the state had actually engaged in the regulated activity. See id. at 44.
Specifically, he argued:
To acknowledge that the Federal Government can make the waiver of
state sovereign immunity a condition to the State's action in a field that
Congress has authority to regulate is substantially the same as acknowl-
edging that the Federal Government can eliminate state sovereign immu-
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sional Abrogation mirrors the Theory of Implicit Waiver since both
require an implicit waiver by the state and a statutory expression of
Congress' intent to waive the state's sovereign immunity.
In overruling the Court's decision in Union Gas, the Seminole
Tribe Court held that Congress lacks the power to abrogate a state's
immunity through legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause. 159 Since the Theory of Implicit Waiver and the Theory of
Congressional Abrogation are effectually indistinguishable, it is
clear that neither of these theories will provide the federal courts
with jurisdiction over suits brought by citizens against their state
under statutes enacted through the Commerce Clause. As a result,
without an express waiver from the state, citizens will be unable to
sue their state in federal court under CERCLA.
V. IMPACT
The Court's decision in Seminole Tribe prolongs the recognition
of the archaic concept of sovereign immunity. 160 Although this
doctrine may have had its place in a society governed by a monarch,
this same principle prompted the writing of the Declaration of In-
dependence. 61 By interpreting Hans as incorporating the doctrine
of sovereign immunity into the Constitution, the Court in Seminole
Tribe imposes hardships upon individuals accused of depositing haz-
nity in the exercise of its Article I powers - that is, to adopt the very
principle [of congressional abrogation that] I have just rejected. There is
little more than a verbal distinction between saying that Congress can
make the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania liable to private parties for haz-
ardous-waste clean-up costs on sites that the Commonwealth owns and
operates, and saying the same thing but adding at the end "if the Com-
monwealth chooses to own and operate them."
Id. at 44.
159. See Seminole Trib 116 S.Ct. at 1131. For a complete discussion of the
Court's holding in Seminole Tribe, see supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
160. SeeJAcoBs, supra note 1, at 150 (noting that "the longevity of legal doc-
trine, especially in the area of public law, is not an altogether convincing reason
for its existence"); Pugh, supra note 1, at 480 (noting that doctrine of sovereign
immunity is grounded in English law, and even England has abandoned this tradi-
tion in an attempt to keep "with the needs of modem society").
161. SeeJAcoas, supra note 1, at 151-52 ("Sovereign immunity in English law
was premised upon the nature of kingship .... This theory of kingship has no
validity for constitutional republics."). Justice Stevens pointed out that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity had its place in England where the common belief was
that the monarch served by divine right. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1143 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He argued that there is little justification, however, for the applica-
tion of this principle in the United States. See id.
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ardous wastes similar to those that were once levied by King George
III on the early colonists.1 62
Nevertheless, the Court leaves the door to the federal court-
house open for plaintiffs seeking relief from their state through
statutes passed under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 3 In Seminole
Tribe, the Court reaffirmed that Congress may use the Theory of
Congressional Abrogation to provide the federal courts with juris-
diction over suits brought against states through statutes enacted
under the Fourteenth Amendment. l6 4 Consequently, by distin-
guishing the Commerce Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Seminole Tribe Court has not completely eradicated the use of
the federal courts in suits brought by citizens against their state.
By overruling its holding in Union Gas, neither the Theory of
Implicit Waiver nor the Theory of Congressional Abrogation will
provide the federal courts with jurisdiction over suits brought by
citizens against their state through legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause. 16 5 As such, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe
limits opportunities for citizens to obtain relief from their state in
contribution suits under CERCLA. For example, under the Court's
holding in Seminole Tribe, Union Gas Company would have been de-
nied the opportunity to seek relief from the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in federal court. This inequity becomes more obvious
by considering that CERCLA could have rendered Union Gas Com-
pany entirely liable for the cost of the cleanup by virtue of its past
ownership of the property, even though Pennsylvania may have
been solely responsible for depositing all of the hazardous wastes at
the site.166 Under the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe, Union Gas
Company would have been able to seek relief from Pennsylvania
only in a state court, regardless of the fact that Union Gas' liability
arose under a federal statute.
162. See id. Justice Stevens contended that, "the recitation in the Declaration
of Independence of the wrongs committed by George III made [the doctrine of
sovereign immunity] unacceptable on this side of the Atlantic." Id, See also Gib-
bons, supra note 2, at 2004 (arguing that Court's reasoning in Hans "makes for very
bad constitutional theory").
163. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. For a discussion of the Seminole Tribe
Court's distinction between statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause from
legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 113-116
and accompanying text.
164. See id.
165. For a discussion of effect of the Seminoe Tribe Court's decision on both
the Theory of Implicit Waiver and the Theory of Congressional Abrogation, see
supra notes 141-159 and accompanying text.
166. See CERCLA §§ 107(a) (4) (A)-(D), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). For
a discussion of this section of CERCLA, see supra note 79.
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In sum, the Court in Seminole Tribe has failed to adhere to the
weight of authority. By relying primarily on its ambiguous reason-
ing in Hans, the Court has condoned the antiquated doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Moreover, the Court offered an unconvincing
distinction between statutes enacted through the Commerce Clause
from statutes passed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Most no-
tably, by overruling its decision in Union Gas and invalidating the
application of the Theory of Congressional Abrogation to statutes
enacted through the Commerce Clause, the Court has revoked citi-
zens' established right to file CERCLA claims against their state in
federal court.
Gregory j Hauck
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